Book Review by Shrader-Frechette, Kristin S.
RISK: Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002)
Volume 3




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/risk
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – School of Law at University of New Hampshire
Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in RISK: Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002) by an authorized editor of University of
New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.
Repository Citation
Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Book Review, 3 RISK 263 (1992).
Book Review
Erratum
The citation for this review is 3 RISK 259 (1992) in most commercial databases.
This book review is available in RISK: Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002): https://scholars.unh.edu/risk/vol3/iss3/10
Book Reviews 263
ROGER COOKE, EXPERTS IN UNCERTAINTY: OPINION AND
SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY IN SCIENCE. (Oxford University
Press 1991) [321 pp.] Index of names, index of subjects, tables. LC 90-22493;
ISBN 0-19-506465-8 (cloth $65.00). [200 Madison Ave., New York NY 10016]
Students of ethics, politics and law have often worried about the
quality of the guardianship of society's governmental decisionmakers
and scientific experts. As Juvenal put it: "Quis custodiet ipsos
custodes?" (Who shall guard the guardians themselves?) Perhaps
nowhere is the question of good guardianship more important than in
the area of decisionmakers' and experts' use of probabilistic risk
assessments, assessments having the power to encourage or discourage
the occurrence of future Chernobyls, Bhopals, or Love Canals.
Three of the thorniest guardianship questions in probabilistic risk
assessment are the focus of Cooke's excellent volume. What.is the
proper role of scientific experts who advise policymakers regarding
existing and proposed public risks? What is the appropriate behavior of
experts, decisionmakers and laypersons in societally risky situations
characterized by probabilistic or scientific uncertainty? More
specifically, what are the ways in which expert subjective probability
assessments can either further or thwart rational consensus about public
policy?
Ever since the 1979 Lewis Report - an evaluation of the major
probabilistic risk assessment of commercial nuclear fission - officials
have recognized and sanctioned the use of experts' subjective
probabilities in risk assessments. 1 Yet, some uses of subjective
probabilities present obvious and serious threats to the public good and
to rational consensus. No one, however, either in the Lewis Report or
elsewhere, has systematically and methodically addressed how
subjective probabilities ought to be used in estimating and evaluating
societal risks. This is the accomplishment of the Cooke volume.
1 H.W. Lewis et al., Report to the American Physical Society by the Study
Group on Light-Water Reactor Safety, 47 (1) REvIEwS MOD. PHYsics 81 (1975);
Study Group on Light-Water Reactor Safety, Nuclear Reactor Safety - the APS
Submits its Report, Physics Today, July 1975, at 38.
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Organized into three parts, the first section of EXPERTS IN
UNCERTAINTY surveys how risk assessors and policymakers have used
expert opinion. The first chapter discusses the Delphi method and
scenario analysis, the two main forms in which structured expert
opinion was conveyed to decisiomakers during the 1940's, 50's and
60's. The next chapter surveys four important applications of expert
opinion: to the aerospace industry, to military intelligence, to the
commercial nuclear industry and other objects of probabilistic risk
analysis, and to policy analysis. Chapter 3 discusses the emergence,
during the 1970's, of expert (artificial intelligence) systems for
modeling scientific reasoning under uncertainty.
Chapter 4 summarizes the assets and liabilities of using experts'
probabilistic representations of uncertainty. Their chief asset is
providing clear criteria for evaluating subjective probability
assessments. Their main liability is that, although training in reasoning
with uncertainty can be worthwhile, experts typically do not handle
subjective probabilities with much skill. Hence, their proffered risk
estimates - of everything from a nuclear core melt to the incidence of
pesticide-induced cancer - are often highly erroneous. To counter the
errors exhibited in experts' opinions, in Chapter 5 Cooke provides some
guidelines for employing subjective risk estimates. He argues that we
need to develop methodological rules for collecting and evaluating
subjective probabilities for things such as technological risks.
In Part II, Cooke assembles the mathematical-modeling tools and
proofs that will be needed to provide a more suitable method for
avoiding errors in the use of expert opinion. He reviews Savage's
normative decision theory (Chapter 6), De Finetti's representation
theorem (Chapter 7), techniques for eliciting, scoring, evaluating and
weighing various experts' probability assessments (Chapters 8 and 9),
and calibrating experts on the basis of their past predictive successes
(Chapter 10). Cooke argues that, by using these tools, one can improve
rational decisionmaking by quantifying experts' uncertainty as
subjective probabilities.
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Part III of the volume develops three models (classical, Bayesian
and psychological scaling) for combining expert opinions into a
probability distribution (Chapters 11-14) and evaluating them. It also
surveys the experimental results obtained from the author's using these
three models in actual technological, industrial and environmental
applications. Each of the applications is employed to quantify and
evaluate expert opinion about probabilities associated with risks such as
space ffight, groundwater transport and chemical-plant failures (Chapter
15).
Cooke's groundbreaking work is of great importance to
policymakers, risk assessors and moral philosophers because it
"downloads" techniques from probability and statistics onto the problem
of evaluating the subjective probabilities of risk assessors. The author
skillfully uses mathematical tools to help solve a recurrent problem of
politics, law and ethics: how to evaluate the decisions of those who, in a
democracy, control science, technology and safety.
Another asset of the volume is its clarity of exposition and its
quantitative precision. (The author wisely places more mathematical
materials in a 25-page appendix.) Cooke's work displays an impressive
encyclopedic knowledge: mathematical, scientific and philosophical
sophistication combined with first-hand knowledge of how to evaluate
the subjective probabilities used to solve real-world problems. His
analysis displays his analytic skills as well as his years of experience in
applying his methods to the solution of problems in scientific,
technological, industrial and environmental risk assessment.
Cooke is especially to be commended for his noting the
shortcomings of his proffered models, for example, the strong modeling
assumptions underlying the transformations used in the psychological
scaling models. 1 He also is careful to point out possible future research
that would improve his models, for example, the need for parametric
techniques to elicit subjective probability distributions.2
1 At 271.
2 At 270.
3 RISK-Issues in Health & Safety 259 [Summer 1992]
The book is organized well, so that those interested in understanding
the policy problems associated with the use of subjective probabilities
and quantitative risk assessment can read Parts I and LI. However,
those who wish merely to use Cooke's models in combining and
evaluating expert opinions, or in applying them to real-world problems,
can read Parts II and II of the volume. In any case, the book is a "must
read" for risk assessors, decision theorists, policymakers,
mathematicians, attorneys and environmentalists, as well as moral
philosophers.
Although there are no major shortcomings in the book, a few
readers may wish that Cooke had spent more time tracing the ethical
presuppositions and the policy consequences of the three models that he
develops for evaluating expert opinion. Because Cooke has come so far
in solving a practical problem of politics, law and ethics, however,
perhaps it is just as well that he has left most of the evaluation of his
solutions to those who follow after him. He has provided a good first
step in freeing us from the subjectivity often associated with subjective
probabilities in risk assessment
Kristin S. Shrader-Frechettet
t Distinguished Research Professor, Department of Philosophy and Center for
Urban Ecology, University of South Florida.
